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§ 44:1 Before Fed. R. Evid. 702: Frye and the “general
acceptance” test
In the 1923 case Frye v. U.S.,1 the United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit considered whether a scientist
who had administered a “systolic blood pressure deception
test” to the defendant could testify as an expert witness to
explain to the jury how the “deception test”—an early form
of a lie detector test—worked and to offer testimony regard-
ing the significance of the defendant’s “deception test”
results. In affirming the trial court’s exclusion of the expert’s
testimony regarding the primitive lie detector test and the
test results, the D.C. Circuit determined that exclusion was
appropriate because the method, i.e., the “deception test,”
was not generally accepted in the scientific community.
As the Frye court explained—in a two-page opinion unclut-
tered by footnotes2—when ruling on the admissibility of
[Section 44:1]
1Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013, 34
A.L.R. 145 (App. D.C. 1923).
2
Reasonable people can differ
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expert testimony, there can be a “twilight zone” where courts
must determine whether a particular “scientific principle or
discovery” or method upon which an expert’s deduction or
testimony is based has crossed the line between the “experi-
mental” and “demonstrable” stages.3 That scientific principle
or discovery “must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.”4
Between 1923 and the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in 1975, most federal and state courts used Frye’s
“general acceptance” standard as the benchmark for admis-
sibility of expert testimony. As discussed more fully in §§ 45:1
et seq., despite the passage of Fed. R. Evid. 702 in 1975 and
the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert in 1993, the “gen-
eral acceptance” standard has continued to survive for more
than 90 years in numerous states because it is perceived as
fostering judicial economy. This standard empowers courts
to restrict or reject unfounded scientific evidence, thereby
presumably reducing excess litigation and streamlining the
judicial process.5 Proponents of this standard often argue
that it creates a limited pool of qualified experts in a partic-
ular field, which, theoretically, leads to a greater degree of
as to whether these features of the
opinion merit derision or admira-
tion.
3Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013, 34
A.L.R. 145 (App. D.C. 1923).
4Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013, 34
A.L.R. 145 (App. D.C. 1923). The
Frye court observed:
“[W]hile courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony de-
duced from a well-organized scien-
tific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made
must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in
the particular field in which it
belongs.” Applying this standard,
the court held that the lie detector
or systolic blood pressure deception
test had not reached “such standing
and scientific recognition among
physiological authorities as would
justify the courts in admitting ex-
pert testimony deduced from the
discovery, development, and experi-
ments thus far made.” 293 F. 1013,
1014, 34 A.L.R. 145 (App. D.C.
1923).
5
Reducing excess litigation
became a political and public policy
issue in the late 1980s. Former Vice
President Quayle’s Council on Com-
petitiveness focused on stricter evi-
dentiary standards as a method of
ending excess litigation. Kaushal B.
Majmudar, Daubert v. Merrel Dow:
A Flexible Approach to the Admis-
sibility of Novel Scientific Evidence,
7 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 187, 194–195
(1993).
But see Kenneth J. Chesebro,
Galileo’s Retort: Peter Huber’s Junk
Scholarship, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1637,
1687–1692 (1993) (arguing that the
Frye test does not reduce excess lit-
igation).
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uniformity. The general acceptance standard also reduces
the risk that a jury will be unduly influenced by a witness’s
credentials6 and increases the probability that expert wit-
ness testimony is accurate and verdicts based thereon will
be accurate as well.7
The general acceptance standard has very real limitations,
however, which became a focal point of controversy following
the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.8 In particu-
lar, the general acceptance standard prevents litigants from
presenting novel scientific theories.9 Although many novel
scientific theories eventually are discredited, some ultimately
become generally accepted.10 Critics of the general accep-
tance standard maintain that it is inequitable, especially in
cases of medical malpractice and toxic torts,11 to force a
plaintiff to delay legal action until the evidence on which his
6While a jury may have ample
expertise to weigh the presentation
of basic evidence, most lay persons
cannot comprehend many of the
technical aspects of expert scientific
testimony used in litigation. Andrew
J. Lustigman, A New Look at
Thermography’s Place in the
Courtroom: A Reconciliation of
Conflicting Evidentiary Rules, 40
Am. U. L. Rev. 419, 445 (1990)
(discussing a jury’s ability to com-
prehend neurological and musculo-
skeletal disorders). Lustigman
notes, for example, that “a jury pre-
sented with a graphic color photo-
graph of the plaintiff’s skin temper-
ature purporting to show a positive
injury will infer that it is objective
proof regardless of its accuracy.”
7Andrew J. Lustigman, A New
Look at Thermography’s Place in
the Courtroom: A Reconciliation of
Conflicting Evidentiary Rules, 40
Am. U. L. Rev. 419, 446 (1990)
(arguing that if scientists do not
agree with a particular technique,
it should not be used in a courtroom
to influence a trier of fact).
8Fed. R. Evid. 702 is discussed
in §§ 40:8 to 40:11.
9U.S. v. Downing, 753 F.2d
1224, 1236–1237, 17 Fed. R. Evid.
Serv. 1 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussing
the inconsistent application of the
Frye standard to determinations of
whether novel theories were gener-
ally accepted); see U.S. v. Sample,
378 F. Supp. 44, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
(“[t]he Frye test of general accep-
tance in the scientific community
precludes too much relevant evi-
dence . . .”). One author argues
that the restrictive standard of gen-
eral acceptance is disadvantageous
to toxic tort plaintiffs who are al-
ready faced with overcoming an
entrenched defendant with substan-
tial financial resources. Kaushal B.
Majmudar, Daubert v. Merrel Dow:
A Flexible Approach to the Admis-
sibility of Novel Scientific Evidence,
7 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 187, 195 (1993).
10See Andrew J. Lustigman, A
New Look at Thermography’s Place
in the Courtroom: A Reconciliation
of Conflicting Evidentiary Rules, 40
Am. U. L. Rev. 419, 447 (1990) (not-
ing that the general acceptance test
fails to recognize the perpetual
nature of scientific advancement).
11Many of these plaintiffs suf-
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or her case is based becomes generally accepted by the scien-
tific community.12
Frye is also discussed in §§ 43:2 to 43:3 and in greater
detail throughout §§ 45:1 et seq.
§ 44:2 The enactment of Fed. R. Evid. 702 and the
Frye “general acceptance” conflict
As originally enacted by Congress in 1975, Article VII of
the Federal Rules of Evidence did not explicitly endorse or
reject the Frye test. In its original language of enactment,
Fed. R. Evid. 702 provided:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will as-
sist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Between 1975 and 1993, federal courts and courts in states
that had an expert testimony rule modeled after Fed. R.
Evid. 702 divided sharply as to whether Fed. R. Evid. 702
adopted the Frye “general acceptance” standard, or replaced
it, and if so with what. Six circuits held that Frye was
incorporated under Fed. R. Evid. 702.1 Four other circuits
fer from terminal illness, allegedly
as a result of the wrongful act of the
defendant(s). Requiring a particu-
lar kind of novel expert evidence to
become generally accepted before it
may be introduced in court has
been criticized as unfair and ineq-
uitable. Kaushal B. Majmudar,
Daubert v. Merrel Dow: A Flexible
Approach to the Admissibility of
Novel Scientific Evidence, 7 Harv.
J.L. & Tech. 187, 195 (1993).
12Kaushal B. Majmudar,
Daubert v. Merrel Dow: A Flexible
Approach to the Admissibility of
Novel Scientific Evidence, 7 Harv.
J.L. & Tech. 187, 195 (1993).
As noted by Judge Brown,
“[T]he Frye test was criticized be-
cause the newness of a scientific
theory does not necessarily reflect
its unreliability, “nose counting” of
the scientific community could be
difficult and unhelpful, and the
standard delays the admissibility of
new evidence simply because the
scientific community has not had
adequate time to accept the new
theory.” Harvey Brown, Eight Gates
for Expert Witnesses, 36 Hous. L.
Rev. 743, 779 (1999).
[Section 44:2]
1Christophersen v. Allied-
Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 33 Fed.
R. Evid. Serv. 1173 (5th Cir. 1991)
(abrogated by, Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L.
Ed. 2d 469, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1200,
Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) P 13494, 37
Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1, 23 Envtl. L.
Rep. 20979 (1993)); U.S. v. Metzger,
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held that Fed. R. Evid. 702 pre-empted Frye.2
The Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,3 which defined the trial judge as
the “gatekeeper” for admission of expert testimony and
provided a much more detailed framework for determining
admissibility of the same, had a substantive impact on
federal and state courts’ application of Fed. R. Evid. 702. As
discussed below, the Daubert decision ultimately led to a
substantive amendment of Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Results of research conducted well over a decade after
Daubert was decided and close to a decade after Fed. R. Evid.
702 was amended (to incorporate Daubert’s standard) sup-
ports some commentator arguments that “the choice between
a Frye and Daubert standard does not make any practical
difference” in the context of civil litigation.4 But, as discussed
more fully in §§ 52:1 et seq., Daubert arguably has played a
role in tort reform, because it requires judges—faced with
tort cases in which expert testimony and presentation of sci-
entific evidence to a jury often play a critical role—to scruti-
nize scientific evidence more closely.5 Thus, some post-
Daubert case statistics lead researchers to conclude that
778 F.2d 1195, 19 Fed. R. Evid.
Serv. 695 (6th Cir. 1985); U.S. v.
Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 27 Fed. R.
Evid. Serv. 938 (7th Cir. 1989); U.S.
v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522, 17 Fed.
R. Evid. Serv. 779 (9th Cir. 1985);
U.S. v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 87-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 9127, 22
Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 537, 59 A.F.T.
R.2d 87-449 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(abrogated by, Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L.
Ed. 2d 469, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1200,
Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) P 13494, 37
Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1, 23 Envtl. L.
Rep. 20979 (1993)).
2U.S. v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463
(4th Cir. 1975); U.S. v. Bennett, 539
F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1976); U.S. v.
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 17 Fed. R.
Evid. Serv. 1 (3d Cir. 1985); U.S. v.
Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 34 Fed. R.
Evid. Serv. 876 (2d Cir. 1992).
3Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d
469, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1200, Prod. Liab.
Rep. (CCH) P 13494, 37 Fed. R.
Evid. Serv. 1, 23 Envtl. L. Rep.
20979 (1993).
4Edward K. Cheng & Albert
H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert
Matter? A Study of Scientific Admis-
sibility Standards, 91 Va. L. Rev.
471, 472–73 (2005).
5Edward K. Cheng & Albert
H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert
Matter? A Study of Scientific Admis-
sibility Standards, 91 Va. L. Rev.
471, 472–73 (2005), citing Lloyd
Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the
Standards for Admitting Expert
Evidence in Federal Civil Cases
Since theDaubert Decision xv (2001)
(reporting that after Daubert, “[fed-
eral] judges scrutinized reliability
more carefully and applied stricter
§ 44:2 JONES ON EVIDENCE, 7TH ED
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Daubert’s effects in civil litigation have been pro-defendant,
empowering “defendants to exclude certain types of scientific
evidence, substantially improving their chances of obtaining
summary judgment.”6
§ 44:3 Fed. R. Evid. 702, Fed. R. Evid. 703, and the
Daubert trial court
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1 two
minor children and their families alleged that defendant
Merrell Dow’s product, Bendectin, when used by the moth-
ers during pregnancy, caused severe limb reduction in each
child.2 Prior to trial, Merrell Dow moved for summary judg-
ment on the basis that the plaintiffs could not show that the
Bendectin did, in fact, cause the birth defects. The plaintiffs
opposed the motion with testimony by eight experts based
on “in vitro” and “in vivo” studies, pharmacological studies,
and a “reanalysis” of previously published epidemiological
studies.
In assessing the admissibility of this evidence pursuant to
the Federal Rules of Evidence, the trial court focused on
Fed. R. Evid. 703, which at the time provided:
Rule 703: Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts.
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those per-
ceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
standards in deciding whether to
admit expert evidence”); Carol
Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney
Exper iences , Pract i ces , and
Concerns Regarding Expert
Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8
Psychol., Pub. Pol’y & L. 309, 330–31
(2002) (reporting results from judge
and attorney surveys that suggest
greater scrutiny of scientific evi-
dence in the wake of Daubert).
6Edward K. Cheng & Albert
H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert
Matter? A Study of Scientific Admis-
sibility Standards, 91 Va. L. Rev.
471, 472–73 (2005).
[Section 44:3]
1Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d
469, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1200, Prod. Liab.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13494, 37 Fed. R.
Evid. Serv. 1, 23 Envtl. L. Rep.
20979 (1993).
2
Limb reduction occurs when
the child is born without fully devel-
oped fingers, toes, and arms.
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evidence.3
The Daubert trial court read Fed. R. Evid. 703 in a restric-
tive manner and, consistent with Frye, it held that scientific
evidence—to be admissible—has to be generally accepted by
experts in the field. The court determined that plaintiffs’
experts’ testimony failed to satisfy this test, because the
testimony was based on studies that had not been published
nor been subject to peer review and therefore were not gen-
erally accepted. The trial court restrictively held that any
evidence other than an epidemiological study was not rele-
vant, and that the plaintiffs’ experts’ “reanalysis” was
inadmissible because “it had not been published or subjected
to peer review.”4 Having held plaintiffs’ evidence inadmis-
sible, because it was not of a kind generally accepted in the
scientific community, the court granted defendant Merrell
Dow’s motion for summary judgment.5
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the Frye decision
meant that “expert opinion based on a technique is inadmis-
sible unless the technique is ‘generally accepted’ as reliable
in the relevant scientific community.”6 The Ninth Circuit
agreed with the trial court that the fact that the “reanalysis”
had not been published prevented that evidence from pass-
ing the Frye test. But, as discussed in detail in the following
sections, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and
issued its landmark Daubert decision, which remains the
3The rule has since been
amended. See § 40:12.
4Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 575.
5Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp.
570, 29 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 749 (S.D.
Cal. 1989), aff’d, 951 F.2d 1128,
Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13014, 34
Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1145 (9th Cir.
1991), judgment vacated, 509 U.S.
579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d
469, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1200, Prod. Liab.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13494, 37 Fed. R.
Evid. Serv. 1, 23 Envtl. L. Rep.
20979 (1993) and aff’d, 43 F.3d
1311, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 14094, 40 Fed. R. Evid. Serv.
1236, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. 20856 (9th
Cir. 1995).
6
Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp.
570, 29 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 749 (S.D.
Cal. 1989), aff’d, 951 F.2d 1128,
1129–1130, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 13014, 34 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1145
(9th Cir. 1991), judgment vacated,
509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125
L. Ed. 2d 469, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1200,
Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13494, 37
Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1, 23 Envtl. L.
Rep. 20979 (1993) and aff’d, 43 F.3d
1311, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) P
14094, 40 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1236,
25 Envtl. L. Rep. 20856 (9th Cir.
1995).
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